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Abstract 
A chemical substance (CS) is instantiated in the material world by a number of quantities of such 
substance (QCSs), placed in different locations. A change of location implies a change in the net of 
relationships entertained by the QCS with the region wherein it is found. This fact entails changes 
of the ontogical status of the CS, as this is not fully determined by the inherent features of the CS 
and includes a relevant relational contribution. 
In order to demonstrate this thesis, we have chosen to analyse the status of quantities of a same CS 
that are synchronically located in different spacetime regions: a synthetic lab, a lab where the QCS 
is turned into a material, an industrial plant, the market where the QCS gets a price and a dump 
waste where the QCS is discarded, respectively:    
Chemical substance  material    (industrial) product   goods   waste 
The use of first-order predicate logic, mereology and locative logic allows carrying out a 
regimentation process that highlights the ontological commitments implied by the formal 
expressions through which each element of the aforementioned series can be described. The 
presence of relational properties discloses the systemic nature of the CS instantiated within a 
spacetime region. The implications of such an aspect are discussed. 
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Introduction 
In the final chapter of the Periodic System, Primo Levi describes the vicissitudes of a Carbon atom 
that moves from its initial location - a piece of limestone estracted in the far 1840 - to a consecutive 
number of molecules, such as carbon dioxide, glucose, lactic acid, again carbon dioxide, cellulose, 
chitin, still carbon dioxide, a protein, and finally an aminoacid that enters a cell belonging to Levi’s 
brain. Whenever the carbon atom is not free of flying in the air within a CO2 unit, the molecules it 
stays in are involved in the most varied physiological processes in men, plants and animals, so that 
Levi defines such atom as “ex-drinker, ex-cedar, ex-wood worm” (Levi 1984, p. 231). Levi’s 
literary virtuosity enhances the changeable ontological texture of the carbon atom that is promptly 
perceived by chemists. These lines conceal a philosophical suggestion that deserves to be caught: is 
it possible to switch from the natural language of narrative to a formal language, able to translate 
and formalize the ontological changes undergone by a chemical entity along its journey through the 
material world? This is the purpose of the present work: to highlight (and formalize) the fact that a 
chemical substance (CS) - instantiated in quantities of chemical substance (QCSs) experiencing 
distinct locations, each characterized by different networks of relationships with the environment - 
undergoes ontological changes. In other words, the ontology of a CS shows an insuppressible 
relational character that may be formally pointed out through the conceptual tools of logic.  
As an example, we have chosen to examine the status of distinct quantities of a same chemical 
substance that are synchronically located in a synthetic lab, a lab where the QCS is turned into a 
material, an industrial plant, the market where the QCS gets a price and a dump waste where the 
QCS is discarded,1 respectively:  
Chemical substance  material    (industrial) product   goods   waste 
It must be emphasized that this is a synchronic description of the presence of quantities of a same 
CS in different locations: in the present context the symbol  only implies a change of location and 
not a succession of events.2 
The aim of this work is twofold, philosophical and methodological. Philosophical in that we intend 
to examine and discuss the above-written series at the ontological level. Methodological, as we aim 
to show that the status of a CS instantiated in QCSs placed in the aforementioned locations may be 
formalized through predicate logic and the regimentation procedure proposed by Quine. We sustain 
that predicate logic is the simplest available conceptual tool that enables highlighting the 
ontological commitments concealed by a description. The choice of CSs as the object of our 
investigation implies taking into account the problems of the whole-parts relationships (CS vs. 
QCSs) as well as the dynamic relationships between a CS and the region wherein it is instantiated. 
Hence we exploited mereology and locative logic besides predicate logic. 
In the following sections we will describe and discuss the use and application of the aforementioned 
conceptual tools in the context of this research. This will lead us to draw some conclusions 
concerning the ontology of CSs. 
Regimentation à la Quine 
As the concept of ontological change is central in this work, it is worth specifying its meaning in 
the present context and expounding the philosophical premises of our research.  
Traditionally, ontology is the philosophical study of what exists: the study of the kinds of entities in 
the real world, and the relationships that these entities bear to one another (Spear 2006).  
Amongst the many existing kinds of logic, we have chosen to follow Quine and the privilege he 
assigns to first-order predicate logic. According to Quine, this is the most suitable instrument for 
                                                 
1 The four examples of different locations points to the fact that QCSs can have very different masses, running from 
grams in a chemical lab to thousands of tons in a plant. 
2 The symbol  was first proposed by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers in 1947, and it is now used in 
process charts, as "a transportation symbol [that] represents a change of location" (Graham 2004, p. 47). 
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highlighting the ontological committments concealed in any linguistic register, including common 
language. Language can be regimented according to first-order predicate logic. Regimentation 
procedure must be kept as simple as possible: “A maxim of shallow analysis prevails: expose no 
more logical structure than seems useful for the deduction or other inquiry at hand” (Quine 1960, 
p.146).3  
Quine provides an effective example of regimentation procedures by formalizing a popular 
observation sentence. With an outright quantification, the sentence “Ravens are Black” becomes: 
 ∀x((x is a raven)→ (x is black))  (1) 
Expression (1) reads as: for any x, if x is a raven, then x is black; other sentences “would be 
construed similarly, usually by quantifying over times or places” (Quine 1990, pp. 23-36). 
Apparently, a very simple operation; nevertheless, Quine immediately claims that in his 
philosophical context (1) is not that trivial:  
“I have insisted down the years that to be is to be the value of a variable. More precisely, what 
one takes there to be are what one admits as values of one’s bound variables”.  
Quine refers to the renown ‘semantical formula’ “To be is to be the value of a variable”, proposed 
in 1948 (Quine 1948). Such formula has strong philosophical and epistemic consequences:  
"a theory is committed to those and only those entities to which the bound variables of the 
theory must be capable of referring in order that the affirmations made in the theory be true."  
In this foundational writings, the great American philosopher warns the reader that logical analysis 
does not disclose ‘what really is’ in the world; it rather highlights ‘what one thinks there is’:  
“We look to bound variables in connection with ontology not in order to know what there is, 
but in order to know what a given remark or doctrine, ours or someone else’s, says there is” 
(Quine 1948).  
The polemics raised by this statement induced Quine to confirm almost verbatim, in 1970, the 
position expressed in 1948:  
“What there are, according to a given theory in standard form, are all and only the objects that 
the variables of quantification are meant in that theory to take as values" (Quine 1970, p.89).  
More than 30 years later, Quine still commented his formula as follows:  
“The point has been recognized as obvious and trivial, but it has also been deemed 
unacceptable, even by readers who share my general philosophical outlook” (Quine 1990).  
As compared to other topics of Quine’s logical and philosophical thought, the regimentation 
procedure has been relatively scarcely investigated. Nevertheless, it drew several criticisms to the 
point that someone ironically wrote about an “armchair paraphrase à la Quine” (Glock 2008, p.68).4 
Such criticisms reproach to Quine an ‘excess of confidence’ on the regimentation of scientific 
language: critics claim that ontological choices are scientists’ own professional duties. We believe 
that Quine never pretend to intrude upon elseone’s field: he just attempted to underline the 
ontological committments expressed by the language, that are unwittingly taken by ‘lay speakers’ 
and are – more or less consciously – taken by scientists. 
In the predicate logic  x, y, etc. represent variables that may assume all values within a given 
domain of discourse5 while P, Q, etc. are functors with one or more arguments. The expression P(x) 
means that x has the property (expressed by) P, or similarly that x is the subject of predicate P. If 
the property expressed by P is ‘to have mass’ and x is a molecule, then P(x) is true; if x is a 
                                                 
3 Italics added by the authors. 
4 Glock is eager for this kind of epithets aimed at Quine (see p. 24 and p. 175). 
5 Intuitively, the domain of discourse is the set of all things we wish to talk about; that is, the set of all objects that we 
can sensibly assign to a variable. 
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syllable, then P(x) is false. If the binary functor P means ‘to be brother’, then P(x,y) means that x 
and y are brothers and the expression is true if, and only if, x and y are actually brothers. Given a 
domain of discourse to which x belongs, the existential quantifier ∃ and the universal quantifier ∀ 
provide the basic formulas: 
 ∃xP(x)  that means that there is at least one x such that P(x) is true, and  
 ∀xP(x) that means that P(x) is true for all x. 
In these formulas, x is the variable bound by quantifiers. If P means ‘to be black’ and x may assume 
all values within the domain ‘the ravens’, the formula ∀xP(x) corresponds to the statement ‘all 
ravens are black’. Hereafter we will introduce other logical operations and their symbols (see Table 
2), but the field here outlined was the ground where philosophers of various schools of thought (e.g. 
rationalists vs. empiricists) fought against each other. This is not surprising as the debate deals with 
‘what actually exists’ and the possible ontological truth of properties and relationships that are 
assigned to what we believe to exist.  
According to Quine’s principle of the ‘maxim of shallow’ - a kind of modern Occam’s logical razor 
- we have chosen to rely upon the simplest and most straightforward approach that could provide us 
with the needed tools for achieving the present analysis. In fact, predicate logic - once formulated in 
a rigorous form - is a flexible and easily-applicable tool, capable of highlighting the properties 
owned by a CS as well as their change, depending on the context where the CS is instantiated.  
Quine’s regimentation quantifies over bound variables. Hence, the domain of bound variables - 
which specifies which values the variable x is allowed to take - must be strictly defined because it is 
critical in determining the truthfulness or falseness of a logic statement. To choose another logic 
(e.g. second-order logic that quantifies over relations) would have implied an uncontrollable 
extension of the variables’ domain. 
 
Some definitions of chemical substance  
Providing a definition of chemical substance seems the obvious premise for a reaserch focused on 
the ontological changes undergone by a CS instantiated in locations as different as a chemical lab or 
a waste dump. The problem is less trivial than it may seem.  
We consider CSs instantiated in a social environment. Hence, it is relevant making reference to 
public definitions, not always congruent with the definitions provided by a strictly academic 
scientific authority. After all, the stringent philosophical analysis by van Brakel has shown the lack 
of general agreement on the expression ‘chemical substance’, despite its being crucial for building 
up chemical ontologies (Van Brakel 2012). 
The official IUPAC definition of CS is the following: 
Def1: “Chemical substance: Matter of constant composition best characterized by the entities 
(molecules, formula units, atoms) it is composed of. Physical properties such as density, 
refractive index, electric conductivity, melting point etc. characterize the chemical 
substance” (IUPAC 2014, p. 265). 
As chemists, we would consider unacceptable to take material of variable compositions as a CS. 
Yet, one has to be cautious in disapproving, because the legal definition of CS in the 27 States of 
the European Union is the following: 
Def2: “Substance: a chemical element and its compounds in the natural state or obtained by 
any manufacturing process, including any additive necessary to preserve its stability and any 
impurity deriving from the process used, but excluding any solvent which may be separated 
without affecting the stability of the substance or changing its composition” (ECA 2011). 
These definitions exploit a same term (substance) to designate distinct ontologies. Their comparison 
highlights that a CS may be identified by referring to distinct material levels (macroscopic, 
microscopic); in addition, they betray a lack of epistemic awareness. Quite surprisingly, a CS may 
be either a chemically homogeneous portion of matter or a mixture: in fact, Def2 admits the 
presence of additive necessary to preserve its stability. Def2 includes two terms (additive and 
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impurity) that are usually excluded by the scientific or didactic definition of CS. The legal 
definition must include those terms because it focuses on CSs that will enter the market; the aim of 
such choice is clear: identifying the substance for REACH and CLP purposes.6 
The attitude of the American Chemical Society towards the identification of CSs is even 
looser as compared to the European legislator, albeit more pragmatic and effective. The Web site of  
the Chemical Abstracts Service (CAS) reports: “CAS Registry contains more than 129 million of 
unique organic and inorganic chemical substances, such as alloys, coordination compounds, 
minerals, mixtures, polymers and salts, and more than 67 million sequences” (CAS 2017).7 
American chemists declare the pragmatic aim of an unambiguous identification: “A CAS Registry 
Number (CASRN) itself has no inherent chemical significance but provides an unambiguous way to 
identify a chemical substance or molecular structure when there are many possible systematic, 
generic, proprietary or trivial names” (CAS 2017). We have not found a formal definition of 
substance by the CAS Registry, but an implicit definition is provided by this list:8 
Def3: “CAS Registry contains a wide variety of substances, including the world's largest collection 
of: 
Elements  
Organic compounds 
Inorganic compounds 
Metals 
Alloys 
Minerals 
Coordination compounds 
Organometallics 
Isotopes 
Nuclear particles 
Proteins and nucleic acids 
Polymers 
Nonstructurable materials (UVCBs9)” (CAS 2017). 
 
The list is astonishing in several ways. A first surprise comes from the extreme heterogeneity of the 
listed species: this reaffirms the generic character assigned by CAS to the term ‘chemical 
substance’. The list includes entities that belong to distinct levels of reality: nuclear particles are 
besides organic and inorganic compounds; homogeneous and heterogeneous mixtures (alloys and 
minerals) are associated with simple substances (metals); coordination compounds or polymers are 
distinct from inorganic and organic species, respectively. Besides, concerning UVCBs included in 
this list – that certainly do not fall within the disciplinary or didactic definition of CS -  OECD 
remarks that “some CAS number definition are rather narrow, some very broad”, but they have the 
advantage of designating and identifying chemical entities in an unambiguous way (OECD 2014). 
 The authority of the previous definitions comes from their being proposed by well-
recognized public organizations and from their being the expression of a collective agreement. 
Nonetheless, all of them are troublesome because they stem from the need to face heterogeneous 
situations (a lab, the market, an industrial plant, etc..). This is not far from the situations described 
in the present work. At the same time, the regimentation procedure has strict rules and the 
                                                 
6 REACH is the Regulation for Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals. It entered into 
force on 1st June 2007 to give a framework on chemicals of the European Union (EU); The CLP Regulation (for 
"Classification, Labelling and Packaging") is a European Union regulation which aligns the European Union system 
of classification, labelling and packaging chemical substances and mixtures to the Globally Harmonised System, 
created at the 1992 Rio Conference on Environment and Development. Behind three innocent and purely operational 
words stays a complex system of classification of risks associated with the use of chemical substances and mixtures.  
7 The Chemical Abstracts Service defines itself as “the world's authority for chemical information”. 
8 Definition by list is a process of identifying all the lower-order concepts that make up a higher-order concept 
(Chaffee 1991). 
9 Unknown, Variable Composition or Biological. 
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possibility of a univocal designation of a CS is crucial for the application of this kind of logic. 
Hence, we have chosen to define CSs through their CASRN as it allows a clear-cut identification of 
the domain of bound variables, as required by first-order logic. Indeed, we are aware of the 
conceptual problems behind Def3; nevertheless, we underline that the widespread use of CASRN 
witnesses an almost universal acknowledgement of Def3 that has the advantage of being a 
pragmatic, operational definition that goes well beyond the boundary of a scientific definition. 
A logic for natural kinds  
Dealing with CSs and their relation with different environments implies taking into account a 
number of problems that stem from the very nature of such entities, e.g. the whole-part relationship.  
‘Mass terms’ such as ‘water’ raise a number of questions that have been the object of harsh debates 
between philosophers and philosophers of science (Kripke1972; Putnam 1973; Needham 2012a; 
van Brakel 1986) to whom the reader may refer for a broader treatment. We would just like to 
remind that even recognized experts of language10 have not been able to grasp the ontological 
ambiguity of signs and words in chemistry. It was up to philosophers of chemistry to underline 
repeatedly that, with the symbol H2O, chemists designate both the molecular species made of 2 
hydrogen atoms and 1 oxygen atom and the CS called ‘water’, exhibiting peculiar properties. Our 
position agrees with Paul Needham’s, who remarks that distinguishing water from ice and steam 
results in severe logical contradictions. The position shared by the chemists’ community may be 
expressed by formal logic expressions and implies that, if we take ‘water (liquid)’ and ‘H2O’ as 
predicates, the sentence:  
 ∀x(x is water (liquid) → x is H2O)  (2) 
is true, whereas the sentence  
 ∀x(x is H2O → x is water (liquid))  (3) 
is false (Needham 2012a). 
It has been said that a water molecule MH2O and a water droplet Wdrop belong to distinct 
ontological levels that may be easily distinguished based on their own properties. If Ptens indicates 
the property of displaying a surface tension, Ptens(Wdrop) is true; the corresponding statement “the 
water droplet has a surface tension” is meaningful and, in specific conditions, it may be 
complemented by the numerical values of some physical quantities (surface tension, temperature 
and pressure). By assigning these very same properties to a water molecule, i.e. by stating that 
Ptens(MH2O), we get a false expression, corresponding to the statement “a water molecule exhibits 
surface tension”, that is devoid of any physical meaning. Let’s now designate as Pvibr the property 
of having a normal mode of vibration: Pvibr(MH2O) is true and corresponds to the statement “the 
water molecule has a normal mode of vibration”, that may be enriched with “at 3657.1 cm-1 and is a 
symmetric streaching”.11 The formule Pvibr(Wdrop) is false, and the statement “the water droplet has 
a normal mode of vibrations” is devoid of physical meaning. Hence, the logic formalism highlights 
that the water droplet is the place where some relationships are instantiated, which lack in a water 
molecule. 
Given these premises, and before starting with the regimentation process, it is worth 
clarifying which kind of logic we intend to use. In recent years, several authors have employed the 
                                                 
10 Quine, in Word and Object, discusses in details the logical gramatics of mass nouns; he wrote: “a mass term in 
predicative position may be viewed as a general term which is true of each portion of the stuff in question, excluding 
only the parts too small to count. Thus ‘water’ and ‘sugar’, in the role of general terms, are true of each part of the 
world’s water or sugar, down to single molecules but not to atoms” (Quine 1960, p. 89). Immediately after this passage, 
Quine argue about the sentences “Water is a fluid”, “Water is fluid”, “Water flows”, assigning to water (at the 
macroscopic level) a property that cannot certainly be assigned to a single water molecule (microscopic level).  
11 This frequence refers to the H216O molecule, one of the eleven water isotopologues (URL: 
http://www1.lsbu.ac.uk/water/water_vibrational_spectrum.html). 
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mereologic logic12 to tackle problems of philosophy of chemistry. An interesting solution, close to 
our interests, was proposed by Paul Needham, who developed a mereologic and modal treatment 
applicable to the logical problems of CSs.13 We will stick to Needham’s suggestions and we refer to 
his works for an in-depth discussion of the principles and applications of his form of mereologic 
logic. A difference between his and our treatment is that Needham defines the basic variables as 
quantities of matter; we prefer to refer to quantities of a chemical substance (QCSs). Our choice is 
justified by the fact that – as we aim to apply the regimentation process to the language of chemistry 
– the locution quantity of chemical substance seems to fit better, as it makes explicit reference to a 
physical quantity that is crucial in chemistry, whose unit of measure is the mole. Given this 
premise, we will now discuss the fundamental mereologic relationships. 
Whenever a QCS x is part of a QCS y, we express this relationship through notation x ⊂ y. 
Notation x | y indicates two QCSs that do not share any part with each other. Notation x ⊆ y leads 
toward an identity criterion, which in the mereological context means to share the same parts. 
Identity of two QCSs x, y is formalized as follows:  
 (x⊆y∧y⊆x) → (x=y)  (4) 
Axioms of Needham’s logic guarantee that for any specific predicate, provided that some QCSs 
satisfy the predicate (∃xP(x)), there exists only one QCS z that is the sum of all QCSs y which 
satisfies the predicate: 
 ∃xP(x) → ∃!z (z = ∑yP(y)) (5) 
Predicates may also have relevant properties. A predicate P(x) is distributive if and only if: 
 (P(x)∧y⊆x) → P(y)  (6)  
In other words, a predicate P(x) is distributive if and only if any part y of QCS x exhibits the same 
property P.  
Quine stated that mass terms such as ‘water’ have "the semantical property of referring 
cumulatively: any sum of parts which are water is water" (Quine 1960, p.91). At a formal level, a 
predicate Q is cumulative if and only if:   
∃xP(x)∧∀x((P(x) → Q(x)) → Q(∑xP(x))  (7) 
∃xP(x) is an existential statement asserting that there is at least one QCS x that exhibits property P 
(such that P(x)); the rest of the expression states that if every QCS with property P has also property 
Q, then property Q is shared by the sum of all QCSs exhibiting property P.  
Table 1 summarizes the logical expressions proposed by Needham. 
Table 1: the fundamental mereologic relationships  
Identity of QCSs (x⊆y∧y⊆x) → (x=y)   (4) 
Sum of all QCSs  ∃xP(x) → ∃!z (z = ∑yP(y)) (5) 
Distributive property (P(x)∧y⊆x) → P(y) (6) 
Cumulative property ∃xP(x)∧∀x((P(x)→Q(x))→Q(∑xP(x)) (7) 
 
A formal definition of chemical substance  
Now that we have clarified both the conventional definition of CS that we intend to adopt and the 
meaning of the fundamental mereological relationships, we may provide the formal definition of CS 
that will be the base of our subsequent argumentation.  
                                                 
12 For a survey of the distinct formal techniques and the problems related with mereology, see (Champollion 2015; 
Harré and Llored 2011; Llored 2013; Llored and Harré 2014; Polkowski 2011; Varzi 2014). 
13 As far as the mereological aspects of our analysis are concerned, we have followed P. Needham (2012a). The 
flexibility of the mereological approach to the philosophy of chemistry has been well argued by Needham in several 
contributions, such (Needham 2013). 
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Let’s designate with A the set of 129 million CSs indexed by the Chemical Abstracts Service (i.e. 
CSs provided with a CASRN) and with T the set of all known CSs, including those that are not to 
be registered for private interests, those that are going to be registered, those that are kept secret by 
national States, those illegal and those still unknown by the Control Authorities; then it is A⊂T, a 
condition indicating that A is an ‘official’ subset of all known CSs. Now, we define Pt as the 
property of belonging to set T and Pc as the property of belonging to set A, i.e. being designated by 
a CASRN. It follows that:  
 Pc(x) ↔ x ∈ A  (8) 
Due to the existence of  z - i.e. the sum of all the scattered quantities of a CS expressed by (5), and 
the distributive property expressed by (6) - it follows that all the QCSs that share the property Pc 
and contribute to the sum z, belong to set A. 
In this way, we assume that if Pc(x) is true, then x is a QCS that instantiates a CS in specific 
conditions. We are aware that this statement has relevant implications; nevertheless, we choose it as 
the basic thesis of the present work and we will argue about it in the following sections. 
 
Table 2 
Symbols and espressions of predicate logic  
Symbols and espressions Meaning 
x, y   Variable in a discourse domain  
a, b, xi, yi Constant in a discourse domain 
R1, R2 Spacetime regions 
∈, ∉ Belonging, non-belonging to a set  
A; T  Set of CSs indexed by CAS; set of all CSs 
P Set of properties 
∧ Logical conjunction  
⋁ Logical disjunction 
→ Material implication  
↔ Double implication  
∃  Existential quantifier: there is al least an element such 
that … 
∄ Existential quantifier: there is no element such that … 
∀  Universal quantified: all elements are such that …. 
∃!   Unicity existential quantifier: there is exactly one element 
such that … 
 Negation 
℩ Definite description operator 
P(x)   x exhibits property (expressed by) P 
P(x,y)   x and y are related by property (expressed by) P 
∃xP(x) There is at least one x such that P(x) is true 
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∀xP(x)   P(x) is true for all x 
∃!xP(x)   There is exactly one x such that P(x) is true 
℩xP(x) x is the one/unique x such that 
 
Chemical substances and spacetime regions: the insight offered by locative logic 
Aim of the present research is the investigation of the changes undergone by the ontological status 
of a CS instantiated in QCSs found in very different contexts (research, production, 
commercialization and disposal). Different logic forms provide distinct strategies for describing the 
status of a QCS in each specific context. We might have adopted a temporal, diachronic logic that 
considers a QCS x at different times. The temporal aspect of CSs is clearly found in Quine: “We 
need all sorts of parts or portions of substances. For lack of a definable stopping place, the natural 
course at this point is to admit as an object the material content of any portion of space-time, 
however irregular and discontinuous and heterogeneous” (Quine 1981). Quine further specifies: 
“Milk, or wood, or sugar, is the discontinuous four-dimensional physical object comprising all 
world’s milk, or wood, or sugar, ever” (Quine 1981). As our perspective insists on the presence of 
QCSs in distinct places, it seemed essential to use a logical form fit to account for the localization 
of the objects under study. We found useful Kris McDaniel’s suggestions as regards the relation 
between mereology and localization (McDaniel 2014). Hence, we take his reference to spacetime 
regions (designed as R1, R2, etc.) as fundamental. The spacetime regions we deal with may be 
physical places, such as a chemical lab, an industrial plant or even an infrared spectrometer, or 
metaphorical places, such as the market.14 In spite of our synchronic choice, we are well aware that 
the presence of a same CS in different places implies that such substance is stable enough to allow 
the transition from place to place. We take that aspect for granted and rather insist on the fact that, 
by laying in distinct locations, the QCSs can express distinct properties. In fact, a QCS instantiates-
at-R a property P: the relation of instantiation that links an object to a property, or some objects to 
a relation is always relative to a region. With Gilmore (2014), we remark that the sentence “an 
object O instantiates-at-R a property P” describes the instantiation as a three-place relation between 
the object O, the property P and the region R; we formalize such relationship through the 
expression Inst (R, P, O). Based on the three mentioned elements, i.e. spacetime regions R, 
properties P instantiated-at-R, and QCS x, we may investigate the broad generality of the properties 
of a QCS x ∈ A, and discriminate four sets of properties, that we designate as P1, P2, P3, P4. Four 
possible cases have been spotted: 
 ∀R∀x Inst (R, P, x) (that is: for any R and any x, x instantiates property P in region R) is 
true if P is instantiated by all QCSs x in all regions R. If so, then P ∈ P1:  
 ∀R∀x Inst (R, P, x) ↔ (P ∈ P1)  (9) 
o The most general example of P ∈ P1 is the simple occupation of a part of region R 
by QCS x. 
o P ∈ P1 may be ‘to have mass’; ‘to have chemical composition’; ‘to absorb or to emit 
electromagnetic radiation’; Pc or ‘to have a CASRN’. From the ontologic viewpoint, 
the above-listed properties are strongly different: ‘to have mass’ is a macroscopic 
property of the QCS; the ability ‘to absorb or to emit electromagnetic radiation’ is a 
microscopic property; ‘to have a CASRN’ has a conventional character. 
o As for the instantiation of these properties, the role played by the region may be 
limited to the hospitality offered to the QCS. In fact, it is often the observer that - 
                                                 
14 Whatever R can be, complying with Quine, when region R becomes a variable bound by an existential operator, an 
ontological committment is taken towards it.  
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based on its theoretical and circumstantial knowledge – assign x a certain property P 
in different situations. Let’s take, for example, the property of having a chemical 
composition Pcomp: by reading the label on a can R, the observer is persuaded that 
the content x is such that ℩x Inst (R, Pcomp, x); the expression reads “this very QCS x 
instantiates the composition Pcomp in can R”. 
o The broad generality of P ∈ P1 recalls the fundamental thermodynamic properties: P 
may be enthalpy, entropy, chemical potential. Note that these properties can be 
defined for any x in any R; nevertheless, we can quantify P only if R is a closed 
system and x is in thermodynamic equilibrium with R.  
 ∃R∀x Inst (R, P, x) (that is: for any x there is at least one region R wherein x instantiates 
property P) is true if P is instantiated by all QCSs x in at least one region R. If so, then P ∈ 
P2:  
 ∃R∀x Inst (R, P, x) ↔ (P ∈ P2) (10) 
o If R is a mass spectrometer (conveniently equipped) and P is a mass spectrum, all 
QCSs x (conveniently prepared) may instantiate P in R. It is possible to go into 
further details as the QCS x is found in a holder R1 that is part of chamber R2 of an 
instrument R3 located in room R4 of a laboratory R5. We will recur to a synecdoche, 
by referring to the chemical-physical lab instead of specifying its sub-regions. The 
reader may well imagine the sub-regions a QCS may be related with. 
o P ∈ P2 may be “to provide a spectrum_______”, to be completed according to the 
any kind of spectroscopy (IR emission, Uv-Vis, etc.). 
o If we focus on physical states (solid, liquid or gaseous), only ‘to be solid’ is a 
property P ∈ P2 because many CSs decompose before melting: the property ‘to be 
solid’ depends on temperature; hence it depends on R and cannot be generalized to 
whatever R. Therefore, as all properties depending on R, ‘to be solid’ is a relational 
property.  
o The standard enthalphy of formation of a CS is a further example of property 
associable to whatever CS, albeit only in a specific region R. In this case, R has a 
virtual and specific character because it corresponds to the conventionally defined 
‘standard conditions’. The tables that list values of standard thermodynamic 
quantities are virtually valid for any x, but they refer exclusively to the ‘standard’ 
region Rst. 
o The stability P of a CS is essential for defining the CS as such: in order to detect 
(and even more strictly, to identify and characterize) whatever CS, there must be at 
least a region R wherein the CS remains unchanged over a definite (albeit short) 
time interval. Despite its stringent character, this P is not an intrinsic property: it is 
rather relational; in fact, stability is strictly dependent on specific temperature and 
pressure conditions, as well as on the absence of other CSs that might react with the 
CS under investigation and chemically transform it. 
 ∀R∃x Inst (R, P, x) (that is ‘there is al least one x that instantiates property P in all regions 
R’) is true if P is expressed by at least one QCS x in all regions R. If so, then P ∈ P3: 
 ∀R∃x Inst (R, P, x) ↔ (P ∈ P3)  (11) 
o The properties P ∈ P3 are clearly discriminant as compared to properties P ∈ P1. A 
relevant case concerns radioactive CSs that keep radioactive in whatever region and 
consequently have, for example, an intrinsic half-life. Similar cases are that of polar 
CSs (which exhibits a permanent dipole moment that is independent from the 
spacetime region R), or of CSs made of atoms or molecules with an odd number of 
electrons.  
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o Properties P ∈ P3 are intrinsic of CSs, i.e. independent from the spacetime region R, 
although R may exert a modulatory action. This is the case of CSs with a specific 
functional group that confers a CS a specific reactivity. The recognition assays 
typical of organic chemistry are grounded on this property. Region R may modulate 
the kinetic or the thermodynamic of a process, but it does not influence the ability of 
these of CSs to react in a specific way that is related with the functional group owned 
by the molecule. 
 ∃R∃x Inst (R, P, x) (that is ‘there is at least one x that instantiates property P in at least one 
region R’) is true if P is expressed by at least one of QCSs x in at least one region R. If so, 
then P ∈ P4: 
 ∃R∃x Inst (R, P, x) ↔ (P ∈ P4)  (12) 
o In this case, the relationship between QCS and region wherein property P is 
instantiated becomes very selective. This is the most interesting situation for a 
chemist; we will provide a few examples. R may be a tumor cell and x may be a 
QCS that may instantiate the death of such cell (e.g. a monoclonal antibody that 
selectively recognizes a receptor found only in that specific kind of cell), leaving the 
others undamaged. R may be a solution containing ketons and aldehydes and x may 
be a reactant that instantiates the separation of aldehyde and ketones.15 
o Some properties that belong to this class may be designated as macroscopic in that 
they are expressed only beyond a certain level of aggregation (e.g. malleability, 
electric conductivity, etc.).16  
o All toxicity and ecotoxicity properties are P ∈ P4. In these case R may be a natural 
or an artificial environment, a ‘model organism’, etc. If P is the property ‘to be 
toxic’, then expression ∃R∃x Inst (R, P, x) explicitly highlights that the toxicity 
depends on the region R where the QCS x is found.  
o Properties belonging to this group are specific of a CS but they have also a relational 
character. For example, capillarity is a property that may be instantiated by a specific 
QCS in a specific region R as it depends very strictly on intermolecular interactions 
between the investigated CS and the material which the capillar walls are made of. In 
other words, such property – referred to a specific QCS x – may be instantiated only 
if region R exhibits specific features. This is a classic example of a situation where 
spatiality (intended as relationship between QCS and region R) plays a crucial role. 
o Even structural properties typical of supramolecular systems belong to this set, 
precisely due to their relational character: e.g. the possession of a specific tertiary 
structure by a given protein. Tertiary structure is typical of a protein and depends 
strongly on region R. When boundary conditions change, tertiary structure may fail: 
hence this is not an intrinsic property despite its being a structural property. 
 
Table 3 summarises the classification of the properties of CSs in relation to both the CS and the 
regions wherein these properties are instantiated. 
Table 3: Formal definition of the 4 sets of properties  
Definition Features of P  
∀R∀x Inst (R, P, x) ↔ (P ∈ P1)   P ∈ P1 is intrinsic and general; e.g. to have mass (9) 
                                                 
15 This is the case of the ‘Girard and Sandulescu’ reactant, patented in 1936; this reactant had a fundamental role in the 
chase of cortison (Cerruti 1998). 
16 In the present investigation – already quite extensive – we neglect the problem of CS’ or system’s phases. On the 
philosophical problems related with phases see (van Brakel 1986; Needham 2012a and b; Vemulapalli 2012). 
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∃R∀x Inst (R, P, x) ↔ (P ∈ P2) P ∈ P2 is extrinsic and general; e.g. to exhibit a 
mass spectrum  
(10) 
∀R∃x Inst (R, P, x) ↔ (P ∈ P3) P ∈ P3 is intrinsic and specific, e.g. to be 
radioactive  
(11) 
∃R∃x Inst (R, P, x) ↔ (P ∈ P4) P ∈ P4 is extrinsic and specific, e.g. to be toxic 
towards the environment 
(12) 
 
In a region R many different activities may take place, by human beings, devices, machineries, 
plants, signs; the region enables the object to instantiate a specific property by entailing an active 
relationship with it; in other words, a property is implemented in a region R through peculiar 
regional activities. On the other hand, a specific and fundamental 'activity' fulfilled by the 
spacetime region is the actual ospitality of the object. 
In the following sections we will need to specify the Ri that is treated at each time; once Ri 
is defined, the four relationships of Table 3 reduce to two cases. In the first case: 
 ∀x Inst (Ri, P, x) → ((P ∈ P1) ⋁ (P ∈ P2)) (13) 
In this case, properties P are general and may be either intrinsic (P ∈ P1) or extrinsic (P ∈ P2), that 
is dependent on Ri. In the other case: 
 ∃x Inst (Ri, P, x) → ((P ∈ P3) ⋁ (P ∈ P4)) (14) 
In this case, properties P are specific and may be intrinsic (P ∈ P3) or extrinsic (P ∈ P4). 
Notation Inst (R, P, x) is effective by putting R as argument of Inst. Nevertheless, when the 
instatiation relation Inst (R, P, x) is referred to a preset region Ri, the heavy triadic notation can be 
simplified, as the presence of R amongst the arguments of Inst becomes redundant. This becomes 
clear by comparing the two sentences:  
(i) “x istantiates-in-Ri the property P”  and (ii) “x has the property P” 
If P ∈ P1, it is intrinsic to the QCS x: for example, P is “to have mass”. Then (i) may be rewritten as 
(ii):  
“x istantiates-in-Ri the property “to have mass” = “x has mass” 
In addition, this P is instantiated by any x in any R. In this case, the instantiation activity is reduced 
to pure locative ospitality offered by Ri to x; hence, for P ∈ P1 we may definitely write P(x). If P ∈ 
P3 not all QCSs x are such that P(x), and the monadic relation is true only if “x has/is P”.17 
 The instantiation of extrinsic properties P ∈ P2 e P ∈ P4 depends on the location of x in one 
or more regions. In these cases, a relational activity between R and x is required in order for these 
properties to be expressed by the QCS. A couple of examples will clarify the relational distinction 
between intrinsic and extrinsic relation.  
If Pmass = “to have mass”, then we state that Pmass ∈ P1; if Pmspectr = “to have a mass spectrum” then 
we state that Pmspectr ∈ P2. A QCS x has a mass wherever it is; hence Pmass(x) is true in all regions. 
A QCS x has a mass spectrum only when it interacts with a mass spectrometer. Hence, by writing 
Pmspectr (x) we intend that “x (in the proper conditions) provides a mass spectrum”. The last class of 
properties to be considered is P ∈ P4. We have already underlined the selectivity of these 
properties. In fact, in this case, the relational activity between QCS and region is strict: this is the 
case of the relation described by the Schlüssel-Schloss-Prinzip proposed by Emil Fischer in 1894 
(Fischer 1894). For P ∈ P4 the presence of the region cannot be tacit: we will treat these properties 
as dyadic relations. 
 
                                                 
17 The grammar form depends on the natural language in use and on the specific property P. 
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The logical apparatus at work 
In the previous sections we have shown and commented the analytical apparatus that we intend to 
apply for arguing about the ontological status of a CS synchronically instantiated in distinct 
locations: 
Chemical substance  material    (industrial) product   goods   waste 
More in details: i) we have discussed the possibility of using locative logic for spotting the 
properties of a given CS instantiated in QCSs placed in distinct spacetime regions; ii) we showed 
that this treatment may find a formal expression through a regimentation process based on first-
order predicate logic; iii) we showed that mereologic logic, that helps defining the relationship 
between CS and QCSs, is compatible with such treatment; iv) we identified 4 sets of properties of 
CSs, based on their intrinsic/extrinsic and/or general/specific character. In the following sections we 
will apply this logical apparatus to the analysis of the status of a CS instantiated in the 
aforementioned locations, from an ontological standpoint. 
Implications of being a chemical substance in a chemical lab 
In the lifecycle of a QCS, the ‘chemical lab’ is certainly the starting point as it is the place 
where the QCS is characterised and identified as instantiation of a specific CS. The QCS may be 
synthesized or isolated from a natural source: no matter what its origin is - and taken for granted 
that we deal with known CSs - the problem of its identification remains: one has to check if the 
(synthesized or isolated) QCS is actually the instantiation of the desired CS; hence, the importance 
of identification. The ‘chemistry lab’ is an ideal spacetime region, designed as RCL, whose 
scientific staff and instrumental equipment are suitable for a QCS x to express property P, thus 
making the expression Inst (RCL, P, x) true. We choose to consider only x ∈ A; hence we write: 
 ∀x Inst (RCL, Pc, x) → Pc(x)    (15) 
Expression (15) refers to known QCSs (x ∈ A). If RCL was a lab where syntheses of new CSs are 
performed, it would be ∃x( Inst (RCL, Pc, x)). Let’s go back to the 4 sets of properties listed in 
Table 3.   
The first set (P ∈ P1) includes fully general properties, to the point that these are not much 
informative with respect to the problem of identifying the CS. Their importance comes from their 
being intrinsic properties, as they are the necessary premises for introducing the other sets of 
properties. This category includes ‘to have mass’, ‘to have chemical composition’, ‘to absorb and to 
emit electromagnetic radiation’, or to exhibit some specific thermodynamic properties. These last, 
in particular, are important for the definition of chemical potentials or aggregation states.  
The second set, P ∈ P2, shifts from intrinsic to extrinsic properties, whose instantiation 
implies an active role of the concerned region. We have already underlined that these are relational 
properties, as they can be defined only by relating each QCS x with a specific region R. This is the 
case of standard enthalpies and entropies of formation that refers to the virtual region identified by 
the conventional standard conditions. Hence, the role of region R is critical for this set of 
properties, as when R is changed the property is no longer expressed or expressible. This clarifies 
the crucial difference between properties P belonging to P1 and P2, respectively. While ‘to have 
mass’ is independent from region R, the instantiation of a mass spectrum is impossible outside the 
region represented by the mass spectrometer.  
With the third set of properties, i.e. P ∈ P3, we get back to intrinsic features of CSs. These 
properties are independent from the region, but specific for a given CS; hence they are useful for its 
identification. Radioactivity and polarity are good representatives of this set of properties, as both 
inherently depend on the physical constitution of the CS, and not on its interactions with the 
environment. Another property belonging to this set is the possession of a specific functional group: 
most part of the synthetic activity is aimed at introducing specific functional groups in specific 
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positions of a molecule, in order to provide it with a precise chemical reactivity or the possibility of 
interacting specifically with a target. In general, category P ∈ P3 may include structural properties 
although not any structural property is independent from the region. For example, proteins exhibit 
tertiary and quaternary structures that are partly determined by the chemical environment. 
This leads us to the fourth set of properties, P ∈ P4, dependent on both the region and the 
kind of CS. These have an extrinsic and specific character. The relational character of this class of 
properties finds here a further specification, and becomes binary. This is the case of solubility, that 
is specific of each CS in relation with each specific solvent: Psol(x,y) means that the QCS x is 
soluble in the QCS y. Binary relationships are fundamental for characterising the relation of CSs 
belonging to set A. The notation that we have adopted allows describing the behaviour of CSs with 
respect to various solvents. For example, would the expression  
 ∀xPsol(x,xi)  (16) 
be true, we would have found in xi the mythical universal solvent. Conversely, chemists hope this 
expression to be true: 
∀x∃yPsol(x,y)  (17) 
It means that for any CS there is at least one solvent; unfortunately, it is often true that ∄yPsol(xi,y): 
QCS xi is insoluble in all known solvents. 
Materials 
In order to define a ‘material’ in our context, we will refer to the knowledge shared by the 
community of material scientists. The Journal of Materials Science, an important journal of that 
disciplinary field, lists different kinds of materials: “metals, ceramics, glasses, polymers, electrical 
materials, composite materials, fibers, nanostructured materials, nanocomposites, and biological and 
biomedical materials” (Springer 2015). Once again, the list highlights the heterogeneous criteria 
adopted for the classification, e.g. the undifferentiated reference to intrinsic and extrinsic properties. 
In addition, the items are not mutually exclusive: e.g. an electric material may also be 
nanostructured. The journal Nature Materials presents itself as follows: it “covers all applied and 
fundamental aspects of the synthesis/processing, structure/composition, properties and performance 
of materials, where ‘materials’ are identified as substances in the condensed states (liquid, solid, 
colloidal) designed or manipulated for technological ends” (Nature 2015). The broad variety of 
materials makes difficult to spot properties shared by all of them, useful to define them; 
nevertheless, we sought for selection criteria taking the risk of neglecting some typologies. Since 
several decades, it has been stated that in order to have a material, specific performances must be 
achieved by processing a given quantity of matter. This commitment is confirmed by Ohring in the 
introduction of his book: “the tetrahedron of processing-structure-properties-performance 
interactions, the multi-faceted processing-structure concerns are the ones this book primarily 
focuses on” (Ohring et al., 2014, p. xiv). According to standard definitions, materials processing 
indicates the series of operations that transforms industrial materials from a raw-material state into 
finished parts or products (Encyclopædia Britannica 2015). The possibility to material processing a 
QCS is a premise for its employability as material; nevertheless, most part of material research is 
rather addressed towards the improvement or the appearance of (new) performances. An important 
case is represented by nanomaterials research, as these are a strongly innovative set of materials. 
We will recall it further on. 
Based on the previous specifications, we will designate as Pproc the property of being 
processed, and with Pperf the property of showing a performance. In the applicative context, 
expression Pproc(x) ∧ Pperf(x) has to be interpreted in its logical value: the fact that the QCS x is 
processed is not sufficient; the QCS must also exhibit some relevant performance (e.g. 
‘impermeability’, ‘resistance to traction’, ‘to be a reference material’, etc.). We designate as Pma the 
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property of being a material. Expression Pc(x) ∧ Pproc(x) ∧ Pperf(x) is true whenever a QCS x is 
provided with a CASRN (i.e. it belongs to set A), it is processed and exhibits a performance; in this 
case we state that Pma(x) is true: 
 ∀x((Pc(x) ∧ Pproc(x) ∧ Pperf(x)) → Pma(x))  (18) 
[QCSs belonging to set A, processable and capable of a performance are materials] 
 
The meaning of (18) is clarified by an example: the QCS x is synthesized in a powder form; it must 
undergo a processing phase in order to become a material (e.g. it has to be melted and extruded as a 
fiber) and to exhibit a certain resistance to traction (plus a number of other performances). A 
relevant aspect of materials is that their properties can be modulated according to the necessity.  
Another example is represented by thermoplastic polymers, whose transition to materials may be 
followed by taking as a reference quantity the Melt Flow Index (MFI). MFI is a measure of the ease 
of flow of the melt of a thermoplastic polymer. It is defined as the mass of polymer, in grams, 
flowing in ten minutes through a capillary of a specific diameter and length by a pressure applied 
via prescribed alternative gravimetric weights for alternative prescribed temperatures. Melt flow 
rate is very commonly used for polyolefins, polyethylene being measured at 190°C and 
polypropylene at 230°C. The plastics engineer should choose a material with a melt index high 
enough that the molten polymer can be easily formed into the article intended, but low enough that 
the mechanical strength of the final article will be sufficient for its use. MFI is a clear example of 
properties P ∈ P4 as it is both region- and material-dependent. 
Many CSs are prepared and purified in a specific way, their compositions and properties are 
verified in order to use these CSs as reference material in various lab practices. World Health 
Organisation provides this definition: “The term chemical reference substance […] refers to an 
authenticated, uniform material that is intended for use in specified chemical and physical tests, in 
which its properties are compared with those of the product under examination, and which 
possesses a degree of purity adequate for its intended use” (WHO Expert Committee on 
Specifications for Pharmaceutical Preparations 2007). A QCS of a common CS such as Lead(II) 
nitrate, conveniently processed, becomes - in the current practice -  a material finalized to clear-cut 
aims, described in these terms: “primary reference material (for complexometry), certified standard 
titrimetric substance” (Sigma Aldrich 2015). In these cases Pproc corresponds to the process of 
preparation of the QCS to become a standard material: its Pperf is instantiated, for example, in the 
calibration of an analyitical instrument. 
 A further class of materials that deserves attention is represented by nanomaterials, 
considering the singularity of the CS-material relationship that they represent. The European Union 
legal definition is the following: "‘Nanomaterial’ means a natural, incidental or manufactured 
material containing particles, [...] where, for 50 % or more of the particles in the number size 
distribution, one or more external dimensions is in the size range 1 nm-100 nm". Immediately after 
this specification, some exceptions are introduced: “fullerenes, graphene flakes and single wall 
carbon nanotubes with one or more external dimensions below 1 nm should be considered as 
nano­materials”. Finally, the European document underlines a difficult aspect: “Measuring size and 
size distributions in nanomaterials is challenging in many cases and different measurement methods 
may not provide comparable results” (EU Commission 2011).18 The fact that nanomaterials may be 
“a natural, incidental or manufactured material” levels nature, fate and industry. Hence, according 
                                                 
18 We have chosen to mention the EU definition because, at present, it is the only one with a legal value. Nevertheless, 
other definitions by Public Authorities are available: an interesting analysis of the various, sometimes contradictory 
definitions of nanomaterials, was published on November 2014 by three non-governmental organizations:  Center for 
International Environmental Law, European Citizen’s Organization for Standardization, Öko-Institut, “Nanomaterials 
Definition fact sheet”, available at URL: http://www.ciel.org/Publications/Nano_definition_Nov2014.pdf  
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to the European legislator, in nature and/or by chance, expression (18) is redundant and the simpler 
∃x(Pma(x)) is true: the man’s role is cancelled.  
The case of industrial catalysts is interesting from both the ontologic and cognitive 
viewpoints. The current disciplinary language is ambiguous as whether the catalyst is to be intended 
as a CS or a material. In the starting chapter of an important textbook on heterogeneous catalysis we 
find that "a catalyst is a material that converts reactants into products through a series of elementary 
steps", and the authors add that "Another definition is that a catalyst is a substance that transforms 
reactants into products, through an uninterrupted and repeated cycle of elementary steps". Clearly, 
the authors do not raise any doubt on such ambiguity; nevertheless, they adopt these descriptive 
terms immediately after: "a solid material", "a high-surface area material" (Dumesic et al. 2008, 
p.1).19 In general, in the industrial context, the system that is introduced into the reactor is a mixture 
of distinct CSs (catalysts, co-catalysts, supports, etc.), and the real (practical) value of a catalyst 
depends on a number of parameters (selectivity, yield, lifespan, etc.). Some of them depend directly 
on the CS that actually speeds up the reaction(s), whereas other results exclusively or cooperatively 
from the CSs found in the reactor. The alternative between CS and ‘material’ is neither a semantic 
exercise not an ontological judgement because chemists, depending on their disciplinary label, 
exploit distinct theoretical models. Experimentalists treats catalytic systems as complex systems 
(i.e. materials), and they employ ad hoc sets of rules and ‘local’ theories that help them in driving 
lab practices, choosing a reactor model, assessing the kinetic and thermodynamic parameters. 
Theoretical chemists have the tendence to study the catalytic activity stricto sensu of surface active 
sites through quantum and statistical mechanics models. Nevertheless, the success of a catalyst is 
the result of a tremendous knowledge effort, fed by an information and knowledge flow coming 
from production plants. If that productive success makes a material ontologically an industrial 
catalyst, then we have to assign the same epistemic value to any single bit of knowledge or of 
practical action which contributes in a necessary way to the final success (Cerruti 1999).  
It is worth remarking that expression (18) includes also non traditional materials, such as medicinal 
drugs, that may be seen as materials that cannot be processed or - as an alternative – materials 
whose formulation can be seen as an expression of their ‘processability’ in a wide sense. For 
example, slow-release drugs are usually based on formulations that exploit inclusion complexes 
where, for example, the active principle is trapped into a cyclodextrin. Similarly, the control of 
pharmacodynamics or of the drug’s absorption in specific districts of the organism, or still the need 
for protecting the active principle from chemical degradation due to endogen CSs, require the 
principle to be included in liposomes. Several variants are possible and they correspond to distinct 
formulations of an active principle that could not be effectively administrated as such.20 A somehow 
similar case is provided by detergents, either fluid or solid, for which the problem of formulation is 
important as well. 
Products 
Remember that TIME is Money. 
Benjamin Franklin (1748) 
 
In our context, we designate as ‘product’ the final outcome of an industrial process, obtained in a 
timelength and amount sufficient to distinguish it from the lab product. We underline the reference 
to time: clearly, this does not mean that a chemical lab does not pay attention to time but, for the 
industrial production, time assumes the connotation highlighted by Franklin: time is money. ‘Plant 
capacity’ means the maximum quantity of product that can be produced by time unit in the plant 
                                                 
19 Further on in the text, catalysts are characterized through their performance: "The central level of research and 
development of heterogeneous catalysts involves the quantification of catalyst performance" on p.10. 
20 More than 40% of new chemical entities developed in pharmaceutical industry are practically insoluble in water 
(Savjani et al. 2012).  
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with the existing equipment. The nominal capacity of a plant is assessed in tons/year, and the 
‘economies of scale’, so important for chemical industry aim at increasing the capacity to huge 
values.  
A property that discriminates a product from CSs or materials produced in the lab is its production 
cost. We designate with Ppc the property to have a production cost whereas Pp is the property of 
being a product. It is then possible to write:  
 ∀x ((Pma(x) ∧ Ppc(x)) → PP(x)) (19) 
[materials with a production cost are products] 
 
 ∀x((Pc(x) ∧ Pproc(x) ∧ Pperf(x) ∧ Ppc(x)) → PP(x)) (20) 
 [QCSs belonging to set A, processed, with a performance and a production cost are products] 
 
The following expression is also true: 
 ∀x((Pc(x) ∧ Ppc(x)) → PP(x)) (21) 
It refers to QCSs that become products without being materials, as they lack the typical properties 
of materials but they exhibit those of products (e.g. ammonium nitrate employed as fertilizer, 
ethylene, etc.). A more in-depth discussion of expression (21) is beyond the scopes of the present 
research. We just would like to mention that some CSs becomes ‘products’ (in huge amounts), 
without necessarily exhibiting peculiar performances, apart from their physical-chemical inhenerent 
ones, such as reactivity or solvent ability. In important chemical industries, such as the 
pharmaceutical or the detergent ones, the following expression is valid: 
 ∀x((Pc(x) ∧ Pperf(x) ∧ Ppc(x)) → PP(x)) (22) 
The performances recalled by expression (22) are the physiological ones (for drugs) or the 
tensioactivity and the detergence power (for detergents). 
An essential difference between a material and a product deals with the different ‘openness’ of the 
information about the material or the product. The material science lab tends to continuously 
change the pool of information concerning a given material, by improving its performances or 
seeking for new applications: the information on the material is open. In an industrial plant, 
information on the material to be produced defines a rigid protocol that has to be followed strictly:  
information on the material is closed, whereas the knowledge that allows a better and better 
fulfillment of the protocol within the plant is open. This aspect includes the role played by human 
experience in keeping the plant at its best performances, by adjusting continuously the operating 
conditions, if needed. 
On the market 
We call ‘goods’ those products or QCSs that are put on sale on the market. We refer to the legal 
market, regulated by stringent rules and laws. A preliminary property of the product is ‘to be 
compliant with legal standards’ (i.e. to comply with current REACH rules, etc.). We designate with 
Pcpl the property to be compliant. The second crucial feature of the product is its being purchasable: 
the product must have a price, transactions must be taxed, the product must actually enter the 
market. We designate as Ppur the property of being purchaseable and as Pgo the property of being 
goods:   
 ∀x((PP(x) ∧ Pcpl(x) ∧ Ppur(x)) → Pgo(x)) (23)   
[products compliant with the rules and purchasable are goods] 
 
 ∀x((Pc(x) ∧ Pproc(x) ∧ Pperf(x) ∧ Ppc(x) ∧ Pcpl(x) ∧ Ppur(x)) → Pgo(x)) (24) 
[QCSs belonging to set A, processed, exhibiting a performance, with a production cost, compliant with the rules and 
purchaseable are goods] 
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It is worth underlining that whenever a QCS is part of goods, the region ‘market’ enriches the 
ontology of the object-goods because this kind of objects is involved in a wide net of relationships. 
Some relationships fall within the area of economic and social sciences, e.g. when the goods 
undergo marketing surveys, lifecycle assessments, investigations on status symbols, etc. Others 
relationships concern marketing techniques, from advertisements to promotional and expositive 
techniques. These are counterbalanced by the attention of consumers’associations, authorities’ 
surveillance (adverts trustiness, possible toxicity, etc.) and private citizens’ surveillance (legal 
protection of patents and brands). Finally, one has to consider the goods-purchaser relationships, 
quite varied and imponderable. In our society, the property of being goods Pgo(x) seems to be the 
highest possible ‘ontological achievement’ of a CS. 
From a diachronic viewpoint, whenever a good is acquired, an ownership change occurs. This 
change is important as the transition from CS to material and goods might occur without any change 
of ownership. But a sale implies unavoidably such a change. This fact acquires some relevance with 
respect to the problem of wastes.  
Waste and its problematic fate 
Goods may become waste in a number of different ways. Here are some examples: unsold goods 
due to obsolescence; unsold goods due to their not being competitive as compared to other goods; 
goods that cannot be sold because are damaged; goods that have been sold, employed and that 
subsequently became (or were judged) no longer employable. In all four examples, waste has a 
common property, e.g. a ‘negative price’ or rather a cost related with its disposal. Let’s designate as 
Pdc the property to have a disposal cost and as Pdisp the property of being disposed of. By 
designating as Plw the property of being a legal waste, we can write: 
 ∀x((Pc(x) ∧ Pdc(x) ∧ Pdisp(x)) → Plw(x)) (25) 
[QCSs belonging to set A, with a disposal cost, and that have been disposed of, are legal waste]  
Clearly a QCS may become waste at any step between the chemical lab and the market. As a legal 
waste, a QCS loses a number of relationships but it maintains its chemical composition as a known 
property. This property is essential in defining its practical and economic fate. The QCS regresses 
to a looser classification, but not all information about it is lost. It has to be said that, would 
expression (25) always apply to the real world, pollution would be more restrained. Unfortunately, 
expression (25) sometimes simplifies dramatically into: 
 
 ∃x(Pdisp(x) → Piw(x))  (26) 
[a QCS that has been (only) disposed of is an illegal waste] 
 
This is the case when a QCS x becomes an illegal waste Piw(x). Whenever a waste is dropped out in 
the environment, a dramatic loss of information occurs because its very same chemical identity is 
lost or neglected. This is the reason why the basic property Pc(x) is no longer included in expression 
(26).  
A further crucial difference between legal and illegal waste concerns their ownership. The legal 
transition from goods to waste implies a change of ownership, but the owner can still be identified. 
Conversely, an illegal waste has no longer an owner. Hence, whereas a legal waste is part of a 
socio-economic virtuous cyle, an illegal waste represents a dead endpoint. 
 The ontological status of waste has not attracted much attention by the philosophers of chemistry, 
in spite of the social relevance of the waste issue and the related negative place occupied by 
chemistry in the collective imagination. Nevertheless, there is a more general reflection on wastes 
and some results are relevant to the chemical context. Jane Bennett, through a phenomenological 
approach, underlined the ‘power loss’ undergone by the material object, either made up by men or 
natural, when it becomes a waste: "Trash, garbage, litter, dirt, debris, filth, refuse, detritus, rubbish, 
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junk: materialities without their thing-power". Bennett presents her contribution as "a speculative 
onto-story", and in fact she refers to a relational ontology: "the agential powers of natural and 
artifactual things, [...] the dense web of their connections with each other and with human bodies" 
(Bennett 2004). With a different approach, Gay Hawkins investigated the multiple relationships 
involving wastes in our society, at the public or individual level. Overall, these relationships outline 
an ethos to which one complies without reflection; nevertheless – according to Hawkins – a 
different way is possible, by making oneself conscious of the "daily rituals of dealing with 
ourselves and our rubbish. […] The minute you start paying attention to waste a different relation 
with it is enacted [...] letting it confront us not as worthless detritus but as provocative things that 
just might make us consider what we do" (Hawkins 2006, p.13). Jennifer Gabrys got to similar 
conclusions as Hawkins: she investigated in-depth the story and the problems related with "digital 
rubbish", and she stated that "waste is more than a heap of defunct objects; it is also a mixture of 
fickering and mutable relations. Through waste, it is possible to think a 'new object'" (Gabrys 2013, 
p. 149). These reflections highlight that the ontological-relational depletion that occurs when 
something shifts from object-of-current-use to waste, can to some extent be recovered through the 
establishment of new relations. This is exactly what - at the institutional and disciplinary level – do 
chemists that are experts of waste recycling and disposal. The philosophical aspects of CSs reduced 
to waste go beyond the immediate economical and ecological connotation. This is Kevin Taylor’s 
position that calls for the need of an "ontological humility" by those who really seek for a solution 
of environmental problems (Taylor 2011). 
A final glance to the whole landscape  
The results of the regimentation process are summarised in Table 4. Before getting an overall final 
glance to the status of a CS instantiated in different locations, it is worth addressing an aspect that 
has been mentioned, but not analysed in the previous sections. We refer to the information and 
knowledge content that characterizes the various steps that have been examined. In each one of the 
examined situations, a QCS is equipped with knowledge and information acquired during the 
manipulations experienced on its way to the location. It seems relevant to spend few words for 
restating the distinct meaning of these two terms. Intuitively, one can say that there are different 
types of knowledge, e.g. acquaintance knowledge (I know London well), ability knowledge (I know 
how to cook a quiche lorraine), and propositional knowledge (I know that all crows are black). The 
distinction between 'know how' and 'know that' was introduced in 1945 by the English philosopher 
Gilbert Ryle.21 In nuce ‘knowing how’ is a way of knowing that is based on experience and it is 
aimed at providing/getting performances; ‘knowing that’ is a way of knowing based on rules and 
operational procedures aimed at describing/explaining states of the world, properties, relations, 
processes. For example, it is clear that the researcher’s ability is not grounded on the pure 
knowledge of laws, rules and operational procedures, albeit necessary; it is also grounded on its 
ability to adopt suitable strategies (stemming from experience), on its critical thinking, its intuition, 
its ability to understand the specificity of a context, etc. In the years that followed the publication of 
Ryle’s work the distinction between 'know how' and 'know that' was discussed and criticised several 
times, expecially because a radical interpretation of Ryle’s thought leads to the evident 
impossibility to reduce all the knowledge about a specific 'know how' to a correlate 'knowing that', 
that may be completely expressed by a natural language. One could say that knowing how cannot be 
defined in terms of knowing that. In other words, only ‘know that’ (i.e. propositional knowledge or 
information) can be formalised by predicate logic, whereas ‘know how’ cannot be fully codified. 
This also means that only ‘know that’ may be the input of a computer or be the object of systematic 
classifications within informatic databases; in fact, transmission of a ‘know how’ implies 
necessarily an interaction between human individuals.  
                                                 
21 A deep analysis of the logical aspects and philosophical implication of this distinction may be found in the original 
text ‘The Concept of Mind’ published in 1949 (Ryle 1949).  
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Column 2 of Table 4 aims at highlighting where, in the different regions R, the information content 
intertwines with the knowledge content. 
Column 3 of Table 4 reports the logical expressions that formalize the status of a QCS in distinct 
regions R, according to predicate logic. It seems important to underline that Table 4 relies only on 
relational properties that are dependent on the region R where the QCS is found and may be 
inherited or lost by the QCS.  
A glimpse to such expressions clearly shows that the status changes from region to region, as the 
number of predicates increases or decreases. According to Quine’s lesson, the changes highlighted 
by the logical expressions are neither merely qualitative nor just intuitive: in fact, the regimentation 
procedure points out the ontological commitments that are implicit in the formal language. The 
Table shows sharply that the highest number of predicates is assigned to the QCS found in the 
market region: this corresponds to a rich relational condition that brings the QCS to relate with a 
number of different subjects and to comply with economic rules, legislation, etc., as part of a 
complex network. Conversely, whenever the QCS is found in a waste dump, its network of 
relationships is dramatically depleted and the ontological status is diminished. The highest 
impoverishment occurs when the QCS is thrown away in the environment, so that even the basic 
information about it is lost. The ethical implications of this state, so well described by the formal 
language, will not escape the reader.   
Table 4: The ontological status of a CS defined on the base of the location of the 
corresponding QCSs x and the ontological commitments entailed by predicate logic. The flow 
of information and knowledge between distinct locations is highlighted. 
Ontological 
status 
R and 
knowledge/ 
information 
flow 
Formal definition based on predicate logic 
 
Chemical 
Substance 
Chemical lab 
∀x(Pc(x) → (x ∈ A))   (8) 
 ↕ Information, 
knowledge 
  
Material Material science 
lab 
∀x((Pc(x) ∧ Pproc(x) ∧ Pperf(x)) → Pma(x)) (18) 
 ↕ Information, 
knowledge 
 
 
Product Production 
plants, 
packaging, 
storage  
∀x ((Pma(x) ∧ Ppc(x)) → PP(x)) 
 
∀x((Pc(x) ∧  Pproc(x) ∧ Pperf(x) ∧ Ppc(x)) → PP(x))            
(19) 
 
(20) 
 ↓ Information   
Goods Market ∀x((Pp(x) ∧ Pcpl(x) ∧ Ppur(x)) → Pgo(x)) 
 
∀x((Pc(x) ∧ Pproc(x) ∧ Pperf(x) ∧ Ppc(x) ∧ Pcpl(x) ∧ 
Ppur(x)) → Pgo(x)) 
(23) 
 
(24) 
 ↓ Information   
∀x((Pc(x) ∧ Pdc(x) ∧ Pdisp(x)) → Plw(x))     (25) 
Waste Waste disposal 
 NO 
Information ∃x(Pdisp(x) → Piw(x))    (26) 
Environment 
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The distinct relationships established by quantities of a same CS with distinct regions depend 
partially on the flow of information and knowledge between regions. We have already clarified that 
a main difference between information and knowledge lies in the fact that knowledge transfer 
implies the involvement of human individuals. From this viewpoint, the chemical lab, the material 
science lab and the production plant appear strictly connected to each other, as researchers and 
technicians (who bear specific and technical knowledge) are continuously exchanged between 
working contexts. A well known historical example is provided by the industrial production of 
polipropilene that required an intense bi-directional exchange between the chemical lab of Giulio 
Natta, at the Polytechnic University in Milan and the Montecatini industrial plant in Ferrara (Italy) 
(Cerruti 2013). Interestingly, when products are driven to the market, a radical change occurs: the 
flow becomes unidirectional and the knowledge transfer mediated by human beings stops. There is 
only flow of information due to legislation or marketing rules. Table 4 takes for granted that, once 
the goods are sold, they become objects of current use and all information concerning their usage is 
lost. This information gap cannot be regimented. When a QCS reappears in the form of waste, two 
possibilities may occur: the legal and the illegal one. An extremely negative aspect of the illegal 
way is the complete loss of information as regards the nature of the waste.  
All in all, the table shows that, whereas the intrinsic properties of a QCS (i.e. the properties it owns 
as being part of a CS) are always there, relations are acquired and lost depending on the region R 
where the QCS is placed. The definitions reported in column 3 highlight that – as long as the 
location of the QCS changes – its relational properties change (they may either improve or be 
depleted) depending on the network of relationships wherein the QCS is involved.  
It is now necessary to reaffirm and clarify the relationship between CS and QCSs. The fact that, in 
the real world, distinct QCSs of a same CS can display different properties at the same time is 
evident. Let’s take the case of the triple point of a CS, e.g. water, where three phases coexist. In a 
same location (the triple-point cell) and at a same time, three QCSs of the same CS water instantiate 
three distinct sets of properties. Note that the triple point is relevant in the definition of the 
ontological status of a CS, due to its invariance, to the point that van Brakel underlines its possible 
use as "defining feature" of a pure substance (Van Brakel 2012, p.203). In fact, the whole research 
activity of chemists is based on the implicit (but crucial) assumption that the results of the 
manipulation of distinct quantities of a same CS are assignable to the CS as such. Thanks to this 
assumption, distinct QCSs found and manipulated in different labs may be compared, as they are 
considered as the instantiation of a same CS in different locations. Our analysis makes explicit that 
a CS is materially instantiated in a region R through a QCS. Hence, the ontological committments 
referred to a QCS may be extended to the CS of which such quantity represents a fraction. This also 
leads to the conclusion that the ontological status of a CS is not fully determined by its inherent 
aspects: it includes a relevant relational contribution. The region may provide meaning and open 
operational possibilities to the CS as, in distinct regions, distinct relationships are instantiated and 
the ontological status of the CS is influenced accordingly. Whenever the CS is enriched or deprived 
of such possibilities, its ontological status is improved or impoverished. 
Conclusions 
"L'idée d'une chose quelconque est l'idée de ses effets sensibles". 
"Considérer quels sont les effets pratiques que nous pensons pouvoir 
être produits par l'objet de notre conception. La conception de tous 
ces effets est la conception complète de l'objet."22 
Charles Sanders Peirce (1879) 
                                                 
22 Peirce wrote the French text of "Comment rendre nos idees claires" (Peirce, 1879) in 1875, as 'linguistic exercise' in 
view of its participation in the meetings of the Permanent Committee of the International Geodetic Association in Paris 
20-29 September. Peirce considered the French original of "How To Make Our Ideas Clear" (Peirce, 1878) as the 
authoritative text for his pragmatic thought (Deledalle, 1981). 
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According to Pierce, the effets sensibles are crucial for defining our conception of a given object. 
The logical procedure proposed in this work is in line with this viewpoint. Hence an object is 
affected by a number of effets pratiques: a complete understanding of the object’s nature has to take 
into account the ensemble of such effects. This implies that the ontological status of the object is 
dynamic and reflects the net of relations in which the object is involved. In other words, due to such 
effets sensibles, the object undergoes ontological changes.  
This is the thesis underlying the present work. We have chosen to discuss the ontological status of a 
CS, a central concept in chemistry. In order to do that, we have applied a regimentation procedure 
based on first-order logic and a locative logic, that are suitable to highlight the implications for 
distinct quantities of a same CS to be found in different locations at a time.   
We believed relevant to formalise through a logical language a usual practice of chemists. 
Whenever two distinct QCSs are obtained in two different labs and the experimental evidence 
shows that such QCSs share the very same properties, researchers are led to the general conclusion 
that such QCSs belong to a same CS, or - in philosophical terms - they consider those QCSs as the 
instantiation of a same CS. The scientific concept of CS is a formal concept and it is thanks to its 
formal nature - that overcomes facts such as the presence of impurities or distinct isotopic 
compositions - that chemists may refer to distinct QCSs as part of a same CS, thus drawing 
conclusions as regards the properties of the CS as such. 
Language is a key issue and the terms employed within a theory are not just the pieces of a semantic 
interplay: their use implies an ontological commitment. This, in turn, entails a search for simplicity. 
Quine reminds that “the simplification and clarification of logical theory to which a canonical 
logical notation contributes is not only algorithmic; it is also conceptual” (Quine 1960, p.161). 
Forms and contents are intertwined. Regimentation requires seeking for the simplest possible 
formal expressions. 
The sharpness of Table 4 demonstrates the changes occurring in the properties of a CS when it 
relates to distinct regions. The fact that such changes may be regimented has a relevant implication: 
as regimentation entails ontological commitments, the formalization through predicate logic allows 
making explicit and arguing about the relational nature of the ontology of CSs.   
As a final remark, we would like to stress that the presence of relational properties has important 
methodological implications and a strong epistemic relevance, as it highlights the systemic nature of 
the CS and the region wherein it is found. To disjoint CS and region may lead to misinterpretations 
and loss of information and knowledge about such system.  
In conclusion, we believe that the present work complies with Quine’s thought when he states that 
“The quest of a simplest, clearest overall pattern of canonical notation is not to be distinguished 
from a quest of ultimate categories, a limning of the most general traits of reality” (Quine 1960, 
p.161). 
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